Technological Capabilities Asymmetries in Latin American and the Caribbean by Gonzalez, German Hector et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Technological Capabilities Asymmetries
in Latin American and the Caribbean
German Hector Gonzalez and Carlos Dario Dabus and Pablo
Daniel Monterubbianesi
CONICET, Universidad Nacional del Sur
October 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19211/
MPRA Paper No. 19211, posted 12. December 2009 12:02 UTC
 1 
Technological Capabilities Asymmetries in Latin American and the Caribbean 
 
GONZALEZ, Germán Héctora 
DABUS, Carlos Daríob 
MONTERUBBIANESI, Pablo Danielc 
 
a,b,c CONICET y Depto. de Economía, Universidad Nacional del Sur. 
a ghgonza@criba.edu.ar  b cdabus@criba.edu.ar c pmonteru@hotmail.com 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the convergence process in Latin America and the Caribbean during the 
1960-2005 period. The evidence is not favorable to clear convergence or divergence trends, 
but to a slight process of convergence until the 1970s, and then global divergence. In turn, 
the results suggest the existence of transitory clubs of convergence during the 1960-1974 
and 1990-1994 periods. After that, the lower income economies showed convergence to the 
relative richer countries, but in a context of increasing dispersion of the per capita income. 
The development accounting and the decomposition of the total factor productivity (TFP) 
indicate that those results are mainly explained by relative differences in the technological 
capabilities, and that the existence of structural differences is a key factor to explain the non-
convergence in technological capabilities. The efforts to integrate the economies were not 
enough to reduce the gap but the divergence in technological capabilities would have been 
worst without the integration process. 
 
 
 
JEL: 047 – F15 - 054  
Keywords: Convergence, Total Factor Productivity Decomposition, Technological 
Capabilities, Economic Integration, Latin American and the Caribbean 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The long run performance of the Latin American and the Caribbean countries, as well as 
their relative lags in comparison with the most advanced economies, is significant to evaluate 
the state of regional development. Nonetheless, in a context of increasing integration the 
reduction in asymmetries -particularly in income- between those economies must be a critical 
focus of attention.  
 
There is a vast literature on economic convergence for a wide sample of countries, beginning 
with the Baumol´s seminal paper (Baumol (1986)), and after that with the works of Barro and 
Sala i Martin (1992), Quah (1996a), Lee et al (1997), De Long (1998), and Quah (1996b, 
1997), who focused the theme towards clubs of convergence. On the other hand, there is a 
line of work that investigate the convergence into the regions or states of a country (Anríquez 
and Fuentes (2001), Díaz and Meller (2002) and Duncan and Fuentes for the Chilean 
regions, Cárdenas and Pontón (1995) for Colombians departments, Utrera and Koroch 
(1998) and Marina (1999) for Argentina, and Azzoni (1996) for Brazilian states. The evidence 
differs among countries. The studies show divergence for Brazil and convergence for Chile, 
while the evidence for Argentina is ambiguous. In the branch of research on convergence for 
countries that integrate an economic region the evidence is heterogeneous. Cuaresma et al 
(2008) found strong convergence for 15 countries of the European Union, while Madariaga et 
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al (2003) show convergence for the NAFTA countries, but not for the MERCOSUR. Similarly, 
the results of Dobson y Ramlogan (2002), and Dabús and Zinni (2005) suggest that there is 
no convergence in Latin America.  
 
In short, there is not evidence of convergence in this region, but indications of divergence. 
This suggests an interesting hypothesis: it can be more plausible the convergence in blocks 
of developed economies, so that the issue itself merits a deeper study. Hence, the goal of 
this paper is to analyze if, under the application of usual and unusual methodologies, the 
non-convergence dynamics in the region is kept. In turn, we try to determine the existence of 
convergence clubs, i.e. convergence among economies with structures and similar initial 
conditions, during the 1960-2005 period. Secondly, we investigate the explanatory factors of 
such dynamics, by means of the development accounting methodology. This allows us to 
discern between possible channels through which the economies diverge or converge. In 
particular, our search is focused on the technological progress as the main factor of the 
divergence in the region since the middle of the past century. Besides, we decompose the 
Solow´s residual to approximate the contribution of underlying sources to the multifactor 
productivity (technological capabilities, as well as technological and structural changes).  
 
The results do not indicate a sustained long run trend to convergence or divergence, but 
transitory convergence clubs. The dynamics of per capita relative income is explained by 
relative behaviour of the total factor productivity (TFP), and particularly by the differences in 
technological capabilities. To shed light about what explain asymmetries in technological 
capabilities, following to Hall and Jones, we related them with some aspects of the "social 
infrastructure" (Hall and Jones, 1999).  
  
Our study is devoted to a set of similar emerging economies, but with differences in per 
capita income levels and growth performance. Some of them have reached a relatively high 
income level, based mainly on their endowment of natural resources, while others have been 
in long run stagnation. In turn, the evidence shows that they keep differences in their 
development level in time, which constitutes a key factor to explain differences in 
technological capabilities. In this sense, the institutional efforts of economic integration were 
not enough to reduce the gap. In fact, our evidence shows that neither foreign trade policies 
nor those measures devoted to reach improvements in institutional quality are significant to 
explain the dynamics of the economies in the region. 
 
In the next section we present empirical evidence on convergence. Section 3 introduces the 
baseline model of the development accounting methodology. The results obtained by 
applying this methodology are shown in section 4. In section 5 we analyze the explanatory 
factors of technological capabilities. Finally, the conclusions are presented in section 6. 
 
 
2. Regional convergence or divergence path? 
 
In this section we analyse the hypothesis of regional convergence by applying common 
statistical tools: the evolution of the maximum gap among the countries, the relationship 
between the initial and the final per capita GDP for each country, the relationship between 
initial income and growth rate for the period, and the evolution of the dispersion of per capita 
income into the sample. Finally, we try to determine the existence of convergence clubs by 
means of the kernel density graphs. 
 
At a first glance, the difference between extreme values for the countries with lowest and 
highest per capita income increased from 7.9 to 10.6 times during the 1960-2005 period (see 
figure 1). As a matter of fact, the evolution of this gap suggests a transitory catching-up at the 
end of the ´70s, followed by a divergence path at the final of the period.  
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Figure 1
 Relative per capita GDP (natural logarithm of per capita GDP, u$s constant 2000)
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Source: Our own elaboration based on World Bank data. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows a positive relation between initial and final per capita values, which indicates 
that the 1960 GDP is a good predictor of 2005 GDP, as well as additional evidence against 
the hypothesis of convergence. 
   
Figure 2
Per capita GDP: 1960 versus 2005 (natural logarithm of per capita GDP,
u$s constant 2000)
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Source: Our own elaboration based on World Bank data.
 
 
On the other hand, figure 3 shows the relation between the per capita income and the growth 
rate for the total period. The evidence is mixed. There are cases of high (low) initial levels 
with low (high) growth rates, meanwhile some countries presents with both low initial levels 
and growth rate, such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras and Paraguay, and cases with high 
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values in both cases, such as Chile, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago. Even though this 
relation is not clear, once again there is not evidence of β-convergence.   
 
Figure 3
Growth rate versus initial per capita GDP (natural logarithm of per capita GDP ,
u$s constant 2000)
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Source: Our own elaboration based on World Bank data. 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the per capita GDP standard deviation. This measurement is 
a proxy of σ-convergence, and indicates a decreasing divergence during the ´70s, but a clear 
reversion and then higher divergence thereafter. 
 
Figure 4
Evolution of the dispersion of the per capita GDP (Cross-section standard deviation 
of natural logarithm of per capita GDP, u$s constant 2000) 
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In short, a first empirical approach is not favourable neither convergence nor to a sustained 
trend of divergence in Latin America, but a transitory process of convergence followed by 
global divergence from the end of the ´70s. Nevertheless, the kernel density graphs results, 
presented in figures 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c), suggest evidence of clubs of convergence.  This is a 
non-parametric estimation of the random variable probabilistic function that, in this 
application, assumed a Gaussian kernel function.   
 
They show the formation of a transitory club during the 1960-1974 period, which is reverted 
between the end of the ´70s. The reversion can be explained by the oil crisis and the 
subsequent debt crisis, which pushed the region into a convergence process toward lower 
income equilibrium. However, the recovering was associated to a new clubs formation 
process, mainly during the beginning of the 90´s. Hence, some of the lower income 
economies were converging to the higher income equilibrium, but into an environment of 
increasing dispersion of per capita income into the whole sample.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Kernel density graphs of per capita GDP (natural logarithm 
 of per capita GDP, u$s constant 2000) 
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These results are compatible with the evidence presented previously. In fact, figures 5(b) and 
5(c) indicates an increasing gap of the relative income between poorer and richer countries. 
In turn, the differences among economies observed in the growth versus initial per capita 
product can be associated with  the oscillating behaviour shown in Figure 5.  And the fact that 
the clubs are not consolidated would indicate that such oscillations can be explained by 
shocks that became widespread in the region. 
 
 
3. Development accounting: an approximation to regional income 
asymmetries 
 
This section presents a baseline model of development accounting. This considers a Cobb-
Douglas function that contain three productive factors and a multifactor productivity or TFP 
variable, which represents the residual of the production function. We assume that all the 
economies of the sample can be explained by the same model. Hence, the residual contains 
all the possible structural differences. 
 
The product Y is represented in the following expression 1: 
 
(1) ( )1i i i i iY K H L
a ba b - -= A   
 
                                            
1 Equation (1) can be reach from a three sectors model, one of them produces final goods and the 
others composed by j firms that produce physical and human capital, respectively. A benchmark in this 
approach is the Romer´s model. In turn, this expression of the production function is used by Mankiw 
et al. (1992), and Klenow and Rodriguez-Claire (1997).  
 
Figure 5 
(Continuation) 
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where i indicate the country, while α and β are the shares of physical and human capital, K  
and H , in the product, respectively, with ( 1a b+ < ). The human capital stock is the product 
of the human capital average level, h , and the workers, L  ( i i iH h L= ´ ). In turn, 
A represents the multifactor productivity.  
 
To determine if differences in income are due to production factors or multifactor productivity, 
we obtain an expression that relates them with the per capita income. Denoting iP  as the 
population of the country i, equation (2) contains per capita income and its components: 
 
(2) 
1 1
i i i i
i
i i i i
Y L K H
P P Y Y
a b
a b a b- - - -æ ö æ ö
= Aç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø
. 
 
where L P  is the labour participation rate and capture the effect of the labour on per capita 
income. K Y and H Y indicate the intensity of physical and human capital in the product, 
and A is the multifactor productivity. This last depends on two factors. The first is called 
“technological capabilities”, and represents a complex set of human abilities, technological 
knowledge and organizational structure, which are required to operate efficiently the 
technology as well as to reach a process of technological change (Llal, 1992). The second 
factor captures the jumps in the production possibility frontier. i.e. changes in technology due 
to learning processes provoked by endogenous factors or incorporated from the rest of the 
world (by means of imports of goods or technology, foreign investment, immigration, etc.). 
These changes need to be relevant, so that they can modify strongly the “real costs of 
production” (Harberger, 1998).  
 
From equation (2) we carry out a typical exercise of development accounting. This consists 
in taking the ratio between per capita income of two economies, and to repeat the procedure 
with its respective components: 
 
(3) jY P L P K Y H Y Aiij ij ij ij ij
i j
YY
P P
j j j j jº =  
jL P i
ij
i j
LL
P P
j
æ ö
º ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
 ; 
1
jK Y i
ij
i j
KK
Y Y
a
a b
j
- -æ ö
º ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
; 
1
jH Y i
ij
i j
HH
Y Y
b
a b
j
- -æ ö
º ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
; ( )
Y P
ijA
ij i j L P K Y H Y
ij ij ij
j
j
j j j
º A A =  
 
where i and j represents both economies, and ijj ·  is the ratio of the component gof per capita 
income. More different values from the unity indicate higher differences of those 
components. Thus, these ratios show what factors are relevant to explain convergence or 
divergence paths. Frequently, these are computed in average terms for a certain period, and 
the persistence of the same value for several periods allows us to verify long run trends. In 
turn, once the more important components are identified, we can determine what factors 
explain the behaviour of such components. 
  
On the other hand, relative multifactor productivity is an indicator of the technological 
performance between two economies, as follows:  
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(4) it it i tA º C E T    
 
where it represents an economy i in the period t, so that itC  shows specific effects in i and t, 
and it refers to technological capabilities. iE  captures the effects that are specific in i and 
invariant in t (for example, the effect of the productive structure on multifactor productivity). In 
turn, tT  is related to the effects that are invariant in i and specific to t (for example, a 
widespread technological shock). Given a technological shock, this component captures the 
average effect on the economies, while itC  captures the differences between them. 
 
Therefore, from (2) and (4) we can estimate itC , iE  and tT , as follows:  
 
(5) 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
it
it
i t
A
C =
E T
 
 
(6) $
( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
 ii
i i i
Y P
K Y H Y L P
y
y a b
a b a b
y y y
- - - -
E =    
 
(7) $
( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
t
t
t t t
Y P
K Y H Y L P
a b
a b a b- - - -
T =  
 
Then, 
(8) , ,
ˆ
ˆ
it
i j t
jt
X
X
j C º ; , ,
ˆ
ˆ
i
i j t
j
jE
E
º
E
 
 
where ψ represents a sub-period of time, Ù is referred to estimated values of the variables, 
and`  the average value. The behaviour of the ratio , ,i j tj
C expresses the relative evolution of 
the technological capabilities between i and j economies. Similarly, the behaviour of the 
ratio , ,i j tj
E reflects the relative performance of the domestic process in technological 
production. Finally, , ,i j tj
T  is equal to the unity for all time t. 
 
 
4. Development accounting: estimation method and empirical results 
 
The estimations of coefficients φ are carried out in two steps. In first place, we calibrate the 
parameters of equation (2). Secondly, the relative components are estimated from (3), (5) 
and (8).  
 
We realized three calibrations. The first is the main case, while the others are introduce to 
determine sensibility of the results to the parameters. Table 1 shows the values for each 
case, as well as the literature associated to these values. 
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Table 1 
Parameters used in the calibration 
Cases a β Sources 
Main 0.31 0.28 
Mankiw et al. (1992), Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare 
(1997), McGrattan and Schmitz (1999), Hopenhayn and 
Neumeyer (2004) 
 
Alternative 1 0.31 0.04 
(1-a- β) from Bernanke y Gürkaynak (2001): average 
share of wage in income for economies of both samples = 
0.648; a is taken from Mankiw et al. (1992) and β by 
difference. 
 
Alternative 2 1/3 1/3 Mankiw et al. (1992), McGrattan and Schmitz (1999)  
 
 
The panel of data corresponds to the 1960-2005 period, and contains the information of 20 
American economies: 10 of South America, 7 of North and Central America, and 3 of the 
Caribbean. Following the World Bank classification, 12 economies are of low medium income 
and 8 of high medium income. 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the relevant variables for the first and the last 
year of the sample.  
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics*. Latin America and the Caribbean (20 economies**) 
1960 2005 Variable Average St. Dev. Min Max Average St. Dev. Min Max 
Y P  1981,0 1435,1 685,7 5425,4 3704,8 2413,0 893,4 9195,0 
L P  0.3 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,0 0,3 0,4 
K Y  1,3 0,3 0,9 2,4 1,8 0,4 0,9 2,6 
H Y  0,6 0,2 0,3 1,0 1,2 0,3 0,8 1,8 
Y (000000) 21987 36088 1263,3 108322 114175 209868 4600,3 739613 
* Average value, Standard Deviation, Minimum and Maximum. 
**Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Source: Own elaboration based on sources reported in the Appendix. 
 
 
The ratios φ were estimated pair-wise, so that the exercise includes 190 ij individuals. 
Figures 6, 7 and 8 show the evolution of the average relative per capita income and φ, for 
each calibration.  
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Figure 6
Average φ`s. Main calibration (0,31; 0,28)
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Figure 7
Average φ`s. Alternative 1 (0,31; 0,04)
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Figure 8
Average φ`s. Alternative 2 (1/3; 1/3)
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The results show that physical capital is important to explain the relative economic 
performance in the region, with changing intensity at different values of parameters. On the 
contrary, labour force and human capital were not relevant; in fact, their ratios were around 
the unity in all cases. Nevertheless, the multifactor productivity seems to be the key variable 
to determine the path of relative per capita GDP. The evolution of φA was oscillating until the 
´70s, but presents a clear process of technological divergence from the oil crisis, and 
particularly from the beginning of the ´80s. In short, these results suggest that the formation 
of transitory clubs verified during the 1960-74 and 1990-94 periods were mainly driven by 
physical capital and multifactor productivity intensities. In turn, they indicate a fluctuating 
evolution of per capita GDP in Latin American economies, which were between a low and a 
high equilibrium. The convergence process around the former was clearly associated to 
physical capital intensity. However, since the middle of the ´70s the multifactor productivity is 
the main explanatory factor of relative per capita GDP, both in convergence and in 
divergence periods. In turn, the divergence process of per capita income seems to be 
stopped in the ´90s due to an abrupt convergence in such productivity.  
 
Figure 9 shows the paths of averages in i of the multifactor productivity and its components. 
The average level of jE  suggests structural differences among the economies, in special in 
their possibilities to absorb and generate technology. Besides, the evolution of j C indicates 
stability in C differences until the beginning of the ´70s, after which they have increased to 
reach their maximum in the ´90s. Then there was convergence in technological capabilities, 
which explain the reduction of both j A and the relative per capita income.  
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Figure 9
Average φ´s of per capita GDP, A and its components. Main calibration. 
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In sum, the evidence show convergence and subsequent divergence processes in 
technological capabilities. In the next section we search the determinants of j C . This should 
allow us to understand the deep determinants of these processes in the Latin American and 
Caribbean economies. 
 
 
5. Determinants of technological capabilities 
 
The explanatory factors of relative economic performance are not captured directly by the 
typical exercise of development accounting. Rodrik (2003), Acemoglu (2007) and Hsieh and 
Klenow (2009) emphasized the role of geography, integration to international markets, the 
quality of institutions and public policy. Acemoglu (2007) argued that cultural differences 
implies unlike individual preferences and beliefs, which in turn leads to different institutional 
arrangements. Geographies features, such as climate and natural resources, are rescued by 
Acemoglu (2007) and Rodrik (2003) as a key factor of the institutional framework. These 
authors state that geography influences social behaviours, physical possibilities and 
economic integration. 
 
In short, this set of variables determines the “social infrastructure” defined by Hall and Jones 
(1999) as the set of laws, institutions and public policies that provide the setting for the 
economic decisions. If such infrastructure favours policies that divert resources to 
unproductive activities, it reduces the physical and human capital accumulation, as well as 
technological transfer of abilities. Hence, different social infrastructure can account for 
differences in relative per capita income. 
  
In the next section we try to verify if this argument is useful to explain the relative 
performance in Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of considering the relative 
per capita income, we analyze its principal component: the ratio between technological 
capabilities.  
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5.1 Data and estimation method 
 
We carry out a set of cross-section and time-series regressions for a panel of 190 individuals 
and 26 years in the full sample. Three sources of differences in technological capabilities are 
identified: (i) structural differences in the developing process of these capabilities (ii) 
geographical differences that determine dissimilar degrees of economic integration, and (iii) 
differences in quality of political and economic institutions. All the variables are, mainly, ratios 
that were normalized so that 0 represents equality, and they can take only positive values. 
Thus, higher values imply higher differences between two economies. The estimation 
methodology and the sources of the variables are presented in the appendix. 
 
In general, more developed economies should be in better conditions to incorporate 
technological innovations. Thus, we include variables associated to the level of development:  
 
[a] The relative income level (Scala2) is given by the GDP ratio, and it is taken as 
principal variable of this subset. In turn, there could be mutual dependence between 
this and the explained variable, so that we include the following control variable.  
[b] The ratio φE, by definition, is the best variable to capture structural differences. 
Nonetheless, this does not present time variability, and then it was not include in 
panel data, but in pool data regressions.  
 
In both cases the expected sign is positive. 
 
To capture the effects on the geographical differences we used three variables usually 
included in the gravity models of bilateral trade: 
  
[a] The geodetic distance (in km) between economies.  
[b] A dichotomous variable, named Border, with value 1 if the economies are adjacent, 
and 0 otherwise.  
[c] A categorical variable, called Area, with 4 options: 0 if the economies belong to the 
same geographic area, 1 if the combinations are South America-Central America or 
Central-North or North-Caribbean; 2 if the combination is South-North or Central-
Caribe; and 3 for South-Caribbean.  
 
In most cases we expect greater different technological capabilities for more distant 
economies. In these cases there should be a less flow of products and factors, as well as 
higher cultural differences, which affect in transfer of knowledge and institutional design. 
Thus, [a] and [c] should be positive, and [b] negative. Once again, these variables do not 
have time variability, so that they were not included in panel data, but in pool regressions.  
 
Finally, the differences in public policies and quality of economic and political institutions 
were approximated by the following variables:  
 
[a] Partner is a dichotomy variable, which takes value 1 when the economies share 
political or economic agreements, which promote a more favourable environment to 
trade as well as to acquire technological capabilities, and 0 otherwise. Thus, its sign 
should be negative: when such agreement is applied there should be lesser 
differences between economies. 
[b] Openness is a rate that captures differences in trade policies. The raw variable used 
in the calculus indicates the excess of trade in relation to the expected values for a 
similar economy (see the appendix for additional explanation).  In turn, if the economy 
is closer to the world implies that it must reach higher productivity levels to compete 
for exports in foreign markets, and, at the same time, it can catch technological 
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advances. Then, more differences in openness imply more differences in 
technological capabilities, so that the expected sign is positive.  
[c] Government is a ratio that denotes differences in the role of the State on economic 
activity. The raw variable is the percentage of national expenditure on GDP. The 
expected sign is negative because the incentives to innovation should be lesser in 
economies with higher state participation. Thus, higher differences in that variable 
among economies should imply lower differences in technological capabilities.  
[d] Inflation captures differences in economic stability. Instability should diminish 
knowledge accumulation and then technological capabilities. Hence, the expected 
sign is negative.  
[e] Conflict measures differences in political stability, and similarly to inflation its sign 
should be negative.  
[f] Regime is referred to political organization differences. The raw variable present four 
categories: civil government, civil militar, militar and others (for example foreign 
dependence). The environment for technological capabilities development is more 
favourable (adverse) in the former (last) categories. Therefore, the expected sign is 
negative: at greater difference in Regime, lower differences in technological 
capabilities.   
[g] Polity3 is a measure of the differences in political institutions quality. The raw 
variable, Polity2, takes value 10 for more democratic organizations, and -10 for more 
autocratic organizations. This was transformed so that it is always positive. Then, the 
expected sign is positive: stronger democracy should show better incentives to 
accumulation of technological capabilities. 
[h] Pluralism and [i] Democracy are similar to Polity3. The first is an indicator of political 
plurality and the other refers to electoral competence and participation. Thus, the 
expected sign is positive. 
 
Finally, variables [f] to [i] are substitute because they capture similar aspects: the quality of 
government institutions.  
 
 
5.2 Empirical results 
 
The estimation was carried out by applying two-way fixed effects (TWE) with panel-corrected 
standard-errors (PCSE). Table 3 shows the first series of estimation, where we take the 
complete model and consider the variables of government institutions quality alternatively.  
 
Scala2 and Partner are always significant and with the expected sign. Inflation, Government 
and Openness remain non significant in all cases, so that they do not contribute to explain 
productivity differences among countries. In turn, these results are robust to changes in the 
proxy variables of institutional quality.  
 
Finally, Regimen is significant and presents the expected sign. On the other hand, 
Democracy and Polity3 are not significant, and Conflict is significant only when Democracy is 
included. 
 
Table 4 presents the results of the regressions with clearly significant variables.  We use four 
alternative models to test the sensibility to the estimation method: (i) by pool OLS, (ii) by 
fixed effects, FE, (iii) by two-way fixed effects, TWE; (iv) by random effects, RE; and (v) by 
TWE with PCSE.  
 
Except the last model, there is coincidence with respect to significance and signs of the 
explanatory variables. The TWE-PCSE column shows that Scala2 lost significance, but the 
p-value takes a reasonable value . The constant term lost completely its significance and the 
usual tests raised notably their values. Thus, the selected variables –Scala2, Partner and 
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Regimen- are strong determinants of the differences in technological capabilities, and this 
result is robust across methodology. 
 
 
Table 3 
Explanation of the differences in technological capabilities 
 
 Modelo 1 Modelo 2 Modelo 3 Modelo 4 
Scala2 1.924241    (0.007) 
1.917712   
(0.009) 
1.915448   
(0.007) 
2.683144 
(0.000) 
Partner -.0447303   (0.002) 
-.0461963     
(0.004) 
-.0453887   
(0.001) 
-.0467217   
(0.000) 
Openness 5.37e-06   (0.959) 
9.25e-06    
(0.929) 
6.31e-06    
(0.952) 
4.49e-06   
(0.883) 
Government -.0823377   (0.187) 
-.0830307   
(0.186) 
-.0788726   
(0.205) 
-.0500908   
(0.158) 
Inflation .0000214   (0.565) 
.0000169    
(0.737) 
.0000184    
(0.618) 
.0000218 
(0.527) 
Conflict -.0000419   (0.720) 
-.0000536   
(0.660) 
-.0000419    
(0.717) 
-.0001737   
(0.000) 
Regimen -.015874   (0.067)    
Polity3  -.000017   (0.985)   
Pluralism   -.0023172    (0.141)  
Democracy    -.0006149   (0.136) 
Constant -.0527454   (0.679) 
-.0472792   
(0.718) 
.00014. 
(0.999) 
 -.1730223    
(.0287058) 
     
Observations 7357 7376 7357 6806 
R2  0.3157 0.3108 0.3151 0.3465 
Wald 146418.48 145526.74 129122.69 1.47e+10 
P-values between parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Explanation of the differences in technological capabilities (part II) 
 Pool EF TWE EA TWE-PCSE 
Scala2 .408648    (0.000) 
.8915019 
(0.000) 
.8844751    
(0.000) 
.5716248    
(0.000) 
.8844751    
(0.161) 
Partner -.0161764   (0.017) 
-.0198331   
(0.002) 
-.041499   
(0.000) 
-.0197683   
(0.002) 
-.041499    
(0.001) 
Regimen -.0320443   (0.000) 
-.0282779   
(0.000) 
-.016966   
(0.000) 
-.028618   
(0.000) 
-.016966    
(0.012) 
Constant .2862467   (0.000) 
.2534225   
(0.000) 
.1958796   
(0.000) 
.276895   
(0.000) 
.1043842    
(0.327) 
      
Observations 8267 8267 8267 8267 8267 
Adjusted R2 0.0145 0.0125 0.0395 0.0139                                        0.3082
Wald 40.62 23.81 9.48 74.62 8.90e+06 
P-values between parentheses. 
 
 
The robustness of results across the selected variables was tested using, in fist place, the 
substitution of Scala2 for the variable related to structural differences, φE. In second place, 
we substituted Partner for the three alternative geographical variables. All new variables are 
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time invariant, so that we estimated by means of pool OLS. Table 5 shows the results. Once 
again all the variables are significant and with the expected sign. 
 
 
Table 5 
Explanation of the differences in technological capabilities (part III) 
 1 2 3 4 
φE .0269106 (0.000)    
Scala2   
.3094159 
(0.000) 
.4093255 
(0.000) 
.4054104 
(0.000) 
Partner -.0184961 (0.145)    
Regimen -.0334642 (0.000) 
-.0331685 
(0.000) 
-.0306728 
(0.000) 
-.0303313 
(0.000) 
Distance  .000013 (0.000)   
Border   -.0166858 (0.000)  
Area    .011152 (0.005) 
Constant .2825022 (0.000) 
.2399167 
(0.000) 
.275537 
(0.000) 
.2607126 
(0.000) 
     
Observations 8267 8267 8267 8267 
Adjust R2 0.0214 0.0229 0.0144 0.0159 
Wald 36.45 55.48 48.68 45.07 
All regressions are pool OLS-PCSE. 
P-values between parentheses. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The evidence of this paper do not indicate a clear convergence of divergence trends among 
Latin American countries for the last four decades, but a slight convergence process until the 
middle of the 70´s, and global divergence afterward. In turn, transitory convergence clubs 
were formed during the 1960-1974 and 1990-1994 periods. Then, the lower income countries 
were converging to the more developed economies, but in an environment of increasing per 
capita income dispersion.  
 
The development accounting allows us to explain such results. This indicates that differences 
in technological capabilities can explain the dynamics of relative per capita GDP. In turn, 
differences in development level are a key factor to explain such capabilities, and therefore 
that dynamics. The intuition is that the relative more developed economies were in better 
conditions to catch up technological advances in the last decades. 
 
A second interesting result is that the efforts to integrate the economies were not enough. 
From 1975 all countries were formally associated in political and trade agreements. 
Nevertheless, our evidence shows that from that time a divergence process took place in the 
region, and this was explained mainly by technological factors. Nonetheless, the significance 
and sign of this variable showed that the divergence in technological capabilities would have 
been worst without the integration process. 
 
On the other hand, differences in the role of State, openness and economic stability were not 
significant. In fact, differences in political regimes were associated with fewer differences in 
technological capabilities.  
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In short, our findings suggest differences between the integration experiences of developed 
and emerging economies. While in the first case the evidence show a convergence process, 
like in the U.E., in Latin American and the Caribbean economies we do not verify such 
dynamics. This states an interesting subject in the agenda of future studies of convergence, 
which is to carry out a comparative analysis among blocks of developed and developing 
countries, to find the explanatory factors of such differences between both integration 
processes.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Simbol Specification Calculus or transformation Source 
 
Y/P 
 
Per capita product 
 
 
= Y/P 
 
Our own elaboration 
 
Y 
 
GDP, 2000 constant 
prices, US$ 
 
  
World Bank Development Indicator 
Online (WBDI Online) 
 
P 
 
Total population 
  
World Bank Development Indicator 
2007 (WBDI 2007) 
 
L 
 
Employment 
 
= (1-U%/100)LF where LF is 
population with working age, 
and U% is unemployment 
rate. 
 
 
 
Employment data: (1) Marcel P. Timmer 
and Gaaitzen J. de Vries (2007), 'A 
Cross-Country Database For Sectoral 
Employment And Productivity In Asia 
And Latin America, 1950-2005', 
Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre Research Memorandum GD-98, 
Groningen: University of Groningen, 
August 2007. (2) The Conference 
Board, Total Economy Database, June 
2009 (3) ILO, LABORSTA Labour 
Statistics Database. (4) ILO, ICMT, 5 
edition. 
 
Unemployment rate: (i) CEPAL,  (ii) 
ILO, LABORSTA Labour Statistics 
Database (iii) WBDI 2007 y (iv) WBDI 
Online 
 
L/P 
 
Labour participation 
rate 
 
 
=L /P 
 
Our own elaboration 
 
K/Y 
 
Physical capital 
intensity 
 
 
=K/GDP 
 
Our own elaboration 
 
K 
 
Stock of physical 
capital 
 
King y Levine (1994)’s 
“preferred” methodology. 
 
 
Our own elaboration based on the 
following sources:  
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Initial K/Y estimated using: 
average inversion rate, 
average growth rates for 
completed period. 
Parameters value as the 
original (delta= 0,25 y 
depreciation rate=0,07). We 
supposed that K/Y in time t-1 
was exactly the K/Y of 
steady state.  
(1) Gross fixed capital formation 
(constant 2000 US$)--  WBDI Online. 
(2) Estadísticas e Indicadores 
Económicos [BADECON] of CEPAL, or 
PENN World Tables 6.2 
 
H/Y 
 
Human Capital 
intensity 
 
Mankiw et al (1992)’s 
methodology: 
 H
st
I YH
Y n g d
=
+ +
 
where numerator is the 
human capital inversion rate 
proxied by the ratio between 
the secondary enrolment 
population and population 
with working age.  
 
The values of the parameters 
are the same that the used in 
the K/Y estimation process. 
 
 
Our own elaboration based on the 
following sources: 
 
Secondary enrolment: (1) Ferreres, O. 
Dos Siglos de Economía Argentina. (2) 
Della Paollera and Taylor, Statistic 
Appendix. (3) CEPAL. (4) Oxford Latin 
America Economic History Database 
(5) UNESCO, Institute for Statistics. (6) 
UNESCO estimates [code 25540]. (7) 
Secondary education, pupils--  WBDI 
2007. (8) Secundary enrolment by level 
BANKS dataset 2005. 
 
Population with working age: population 
between 15 and 64 years old, and total 
population, WBDI 2007. 
 
 
Scala2 
 
Relative development 
level 
 
 
= abs(1-ratio(lnGDP)) 
 
Our own elaboration 
 
Distance 
 
Geodesic distance 
(Kms) between two 
economies 
 
See details  in “Notes on 
CEPII’s distances 
measures”, G. Gaulier, T. 
Mayer y S. Zignago (2004) 
 
 
CEPII 
 
Border 
 
Dichotomy variable 
 
1 if the economies are 
neighbours  
0 if not 
 
 
Our own elaboration 
 
Area 
 
Categorical variable 
 
0 if the economies are in the 
same subcontinent 
1 if the combination is South 
America-Central America, 
Central-North or North-
Caribbean 
2 if South-North or Central-
Caribbean 
3 if South-Caribbean 
 
 
Our own elaboration 
 
Partner 
 
Dichotomy variable 
 
1if the economies share 
political or trade agreements 
0 if not. 
 
 
Our own elaboration based on INTAL 
database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Openness 
 
Ratio 
 
=abs(1-ratio(Residual)),  
where Residual = Residual of 
the following cross-section 
 
Our own elaboration.  
 
Oil dummy from CEPII and WBDI 2007 
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pool OLS regresión: 
[(M+X)/GDP]t = 
a+b*[ln(P)]t+c*(KM2)+d*ln(Y/
P)t+g*Oil_dummy+g*Island_
dummy+residual  
 
See Pritchet (1996) and 
Blyde y Fernandez Arias 
(2005). 
 
 
Government 
 
Ratio 
 
=abs(1-ratio(lnGP)), 
GP=public expenditure on 
GDP 
 
 
Our own elaboration based on: 
Government Share of CGDP, % in 
Current Prices, Alan Heston, Robert 
Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World 
Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of 
Production, Income and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania, September 
2006. 
 
 
Inflation 
 
Ratio 
 
=abs(1-ratio(Inf)),  
Inf=ln(1+inflation rate/100) 
 
 
Our own elaboration based on: Inflation, 
consumer prices (annual %) WBDI 
2007 
 
Conflict 
 
 
Difference 
 
=abs(CBi-CBj),  
CB=Conflict indicator 
 
 
Our own elaboration based on: conflict 
indicator from Banks' Cross-National 
Time-Series Data Archive 
 
 
 
Regimen 
 
Difference 
 
=abs(Regi-Regj), 
Reg is the regimen type: (1) 
Civil (2) Militar-Civil (3) Militar 
(4) Other   
 
 
Our own elaboration based on: regimen 
from Banks' Cross-National Time-
Series Data Archive 
 
 
Polity3 
 
Difference 
 
=abs(POLi-POLj) 
POL=Polity2+10 
 
Our own elaboration based on: Polity2 
of Polity IV Project Center for Global 
Policy School of Public Policy George 
Mason University 
 
 
Pluralism 
 
Difference 
 
=abs(PLi-PLj) 
PL = pluralism indicator 
 
 
Our own elaboration based on: 
pluralism indicator from Banks' Cross-
National Time-Series Data Archive 
 
 
Democracy 
 
Difference 
 
=abs(DEMOi-DEMOj),  
DEMO = indicator of quality 
of democracy  
 
 
Our own elaboration based on: 
Democracy from Vanhanen (2002) 
Polyarchy Database 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
